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DRAFT #4

15 May 1952

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(USSR, Soviet Orbit, Free World,
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CIA APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
(Means Paper)

Note: This is the second of three papers which deals with an approach toward the development of a national psychological strategy with principal emphasis on an appraisal of the most effective means (courses of action).

I. THE PROBLEM

To determine and evaluate the most effective courses of action the U. S. Government could pursue, unilaterally or with its allies, to achieve the reduction of Soviet power and to foster a stronger orientation of the free world toward the U. S.

II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

From a CIA/opc point of view with respect to desirability and priority, the courses of action listed should be:

- A. Initiated or implemented within the near-term future (by the end of 1953); and
- B. Considered as the type of actions which will have the greatest impact toward advancement of our national objectives, irrespective of existing capabilities or policy problems.

III. GENERAL ANALYSIS

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III. GENERAL ANALYSIS

CIA/opc has approached the problem of selecting actions which would be most effective in a national strategy by placing principal emphasis on those efforts which will give the greatest support to the attainment of U. S. objectives. The range of choice has been narrowed to those major efforts for which coordination of overt and covert measures of the U. S. Government can best be achieved. One failing in our covert effort to date has been the inability to concentrate limited resources on priority actions and our failure to prevent a wide dissipation of such resources (trained personnel, money, and materials). Necessity initially required the adoption of a containment policy to counter the Soviet threat. We need now to proceed to undertakings that will permit us to be responsive to NSC 68, which envisions the wresting of the initiative from the Soviet Union.

The continuing build-up of strength is a pre-requisite to the achievement of our principal objective, national security, and to the establishment of a durable world order to keep the peace. Essential, therefore, to the undertaking of a national strategic plan is a reaffirmed declaration to free and subjected peoples of our principles and purposes. It must have as strong and ringing an appeal as the "four freedoms," and be understandable in the terms of aspirations of individual human beings living under many circumstances.

The courses of action discussed in this paper are placed generally in a group category of the USSR, the Soviet Orbit, the Free World, and the Far East, rather than discussed as a geographical complex or individual country. The paper has intentionally avoided discussion of courses of action for

Southeast Asia

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Southeast Asia or the Middle East, since these are parts of a separate panel study of the Psychological Strategy Board and are considered primarily areas of holding action rather than areas of offensive action. Certain of the

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The means selected were those which would fill gaps in our present foreign program and could become the strong supports of a revitalized national strategy. Due regard must be paid to the practicality of keeping our actions within feasible limits and as consistent as possible with the interests, influence, and objectives and capabilities of our major allies. Desirable as it may seem to capture nationalism for Western ends, practical considerations make this goal problematical for the immediate future.

The liberation of the Russian people is not considered to be a feasible undertaking for the next several years. The chances of effecting the detachment of one or more of the satellites is regarded as more feasible,

but barring

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but barring developments not presently foreseen, this is not considered a likely near-term possibility. If the successful integration of Germany into a Western European organization can be achieved, some basis may exist for the ultimate evolution of a Eastern European political and economic federation which would not fear the resurgence of a militaristic Germany on one side, and, at the same time, maintain a compatible relationship with the Soviet Union on the other side.

Our principal actions, therefore, should be the continued build-up of strength and the application of increasing psychological pressures against critical targets or areas where dividends are foreseeable.

It should be recognized that it is difficult, at best, to estimate the effectiveness of isolated covert actions without knowing the over-all framework into which they might fit and the amount of mutually related overt effort that will be applied to the same general target.

Although not germane to the immediate problem, we need to take preparatory actions ahead of time to establish our influence in areas of future contention. Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian sub-continent are areas which should be considered in a long-range strategic plan, rather than wait for developments which would require us to take hasty or opportunistic actions.

Just as the destruction of Nazism, Fascism, and Japanese imperialism were the objectives of World War II, and the elimination of Kremlin-directed Communism is the objective of the current cold war, we must be prepared to forestall and prevent nascent racism from being the issue of struggle for future generations. With perspicacity and understanding, we should lay the groundwork now which will prevent the issue of racism succeeding the current ideological struggle.

Accepting the philosophy,

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Accepting the philosophy, therefore, that the struggle for world power will extend over the next ten to twenty years, it behooves us to lay the foundations of a strategy which will be most rewarding to us at the time the Communist vs. Free World struggle reaches its climax.

IV. PROPOSED COURSES

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B. (USSR) Intensify the world-wide restrictive and embargo provisions laid on East-West trade to reduce the war potential of the USSR and its satellites.

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1. Principal Advantages:

- a. Limits consolidation of an economy not fully recovered from World War II.
- b. Makes available to the free world, materials which might otherwise be diverted to the Soviet bloc.
- c. Develops economic strength of free world.
- d. After establishing sufficient control of economic forces between the West and East, it may be possible to negotiate economic adjustments between the power blocs favorable to the West, area by area, as opportunity arises.

2. Limiting Factors:

- a. In the international community of NATO, it causes economic and political stresses and strains.
- b. Deprives certain NATO countries of markets and supplies, thereby causing internal instability.

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3. Feasibility, Emphasis

3. Feasibility, Emphasis, and Pace:

Economic factors and conditions play a vital role in world affairs and are a strong support pillar of politics. The shrinkage of the free circulation of goods through economic blockade, rigidly enforced and subscribed to, is an intangible power factor and element of pressure which may modify the hitherto intransigent attitude and position of the Soviet Union. Its effect can be gauged to date by the Soviet reactions, which include their efforts to ameliorate this pinch through such devices as the Moscow Economic Conference.

The basis for extension of economic blockade exist in the form of current prohibitive international lists I, II, and III, which have been successful in reducing the Soviet war potential and increasing the economic and political difficulties of the satellite regimes. Increased pressures in concert and agreement with our allies should further reduce the flow of essential goods and commodities.

Consistent with policy determinations and the adoption of centralized guidance, the emphasis should be placed on unexploited economic warfare techniques, more precise selectivity of targets, and methods with an emphasis expanded on covert methods.

For the balance of 1952, the preliminary arrangements for applying maximum pressures against the Soviets and satellites in the spring of 1953 should be made a priority target.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

D. (SOVIET ORBIT) Undertake to accelerate the economic deterioration of satellite countries, and especially Czechoslovakia, in order to reduce their usefulness to the economy of the USSR and the Soviet orbit, and to create conditions which result in political defection of individuals and possibly even governments.

1. Principal Advantages:

- a. Breakdown industrial potential.
- b. Deprives USSR of military and economic supplies.
- c. Bolsters the morale of the anti-Communist Czechs and Slovaks by giving them something useful to do in behalf of their liberation.
- d. Disrupts the Communist hierarchy with purges and executions.
- e. Defects or undermines key personalities, including scientists, technicians and managerial talent.

2. Limiting Factors:

- a. Requires some agreement and action by pro-Western powers.
- b. Limited accessibility to area.
- c. Degree of Soviet integration into its own economic structure.

3. Feasibility, Emphasis, and Pace:



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Czechoslovakia is economically the most vulnerable member of the Soviet orbit.

There have been recent indications that Czechoslovakia is experiencing difficulty in meeting quota requirements and the preconditions exist for economic penetration and diversions. The industrial potential of this country is of key importance to the Soviet war potential. Failure to contribute more to the Soviet



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
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I. (Free World) Recognizing the evolving status of India and Pakistan in world affairs, undertake steps which will lead to the sponsorship of programs designed to strengthen their orientation toward


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the West, [REDACTED]



1. Principal Advantages:

- a. Contribute to the political stability of the area (Burma, Indonesia, etc.) and decrease social discontent.
- b. Reduce the effectiveness of Communist propaganda in an area of social and political instability.
- c. Stem the advance of Communism.
- d. Strengthen the Asiatic bloc of nations opposed to Communist aggression.
- e. Add India's manpower potential to bolster the defense of Asia.
- f. Show U. S. interest in the well-being of Indian peoples.

25X1G. Assure Pakistani influence in the Moslem world.



2. Limiting Factors:

- a. Antagonism toward Western influence.
- b. Unpredictable qualities of political leadership.
- c. Lack of strongly established political, economic, and social bases.
- d. Conflict of interests between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and other matters.

3. Feasibility:

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Our program for the sub-continent should be initiated now and phased over a ten-year cycle. Vast expenditures of money are to be avoided and the evolving status of India continually evaluated to prevent India from becoming a man of U. S. intervention.

There is reason to believe that Pakistan can be developed into an anti-Communist, pro-U.S. stronghold. Occupying a key position in the Moslem world, as well as an important strategic position,

Pakistan should not be overlooked

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J. (Free World)

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L. (Far East) Support the political and economic development of Japan as an anti-Communist stronghold in the Far East through indigenous groups.

1. Principal Advantages:

a. Positive programs for economic opportunity, equitable compensation, and individual development within the country will develop an economically stable and self-reliant country.

b. Government leaders could take necessary measures to strengthen their financial positions, increase productivity, and assist other members of free Asia toward industrial rehabilitation.

c. Assists free world by cooperating in international trade in the allocation of strategic materials, in supporting trade measures against the Soviet bloc, and forming a solid economic front against Communism.

d. Afford a means of supplying free Asia with the necessary armaments to build up their defensive capabilities.



2. Limiting Factors:

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In view of world economic conditions favorable to the development of Asian markets, such a plan should be developed in 1952 and inaugurated in 1953.

M. (Far East)

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ANNEX 1

SPECIFIC ISSUES OF CONFLICT

USSR:

1. Refusal to abide by accepted principles of international law or treaties.
2. Military threat to the peace and security of the world.
3. Vilification of the United States.
4. Fraudulent participation and disregard of obligations in the United Nations.
5. Retention of large blocks of World War II prisoners of war.
6. Failure to negotiate and agree to Japanese, Austrian, and German reasonable peace treaties.
7. Establishment and support of a Moscow dominated communist apparatus in the free world.
8. Harassment of the free world by unconventional methods.
9. Refusal to agree to any effective control of conventional armaments or atomic energy.

Soviet Orbit: (European Satellites)

1. Integration of satellite countries into the Soviet political system accomplished by a calculated disregard of national and human rights.
2. Isolation of satellite peoples from contact with the free world.
3. Build-up of satellite conventional and unconventional military forces for aggression.

4. Disregard of

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4. Disregard of international law and flagrant violation of existing Balkan peace treaties.

5. Fraudulent participation and disregard of obligations in the United Nations.

Soviet Orbit (China):

1. Liquidation of the West's position in China.
2. Illegal subversive methods and military aggression, which threaten peace and security of the Far East.
3. Sovereignty encroachments.
4. Peiping-Moscow alliance.
5. United Nations membership for Communist China and conflicts between de jure and de facto Chinese governments.

Neutrals:

1. Non-appreciation of the militant communist threat and failure to align themselves with the free world.
2. Failure to take positive steps to eliminate disruptive internal communist threats.
3. Direct exploitation of East-West differences to their own advantage.

Conflicts within the Free World:

1. Divergencies with respect to foreign policy concepts as they pertain to the Far East, the Middle East, East-West trade, European unity, peace treaties, colonialism, and rearmament.

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2. Failure to take stringent steps toward reduction of the influence of indigenous Communist Parties.

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ANNEX 2

PRINCIPAL COMMUNIST VULNERABILITIES

A. Ideological:

1. Atheism -- Anti-Semitism
2. Disregard for the dignity of the individual.
 - a. Slave labor.
 - b. Treatment of political prisoners.
 - c. Unreturned war prisoners.
 - d. Censorship.
3. Contradictions in Communist theories and practices.

B. Political:

1. Extreme centralization of political control.
2. Necessity of political conformity.
3. Communist Party "elite," and frustration of potential new leaders.
4. Variable policies toward subject nationalities and minorities.
5. Soviet bloc representatives exposed to Western influences.

C. Economic:

1. A planned economy which restricts the capacity to meet changing conditions, limits productivity, distribution and efficiency; and fails to exploit the impetus of the profit motive. Certain manifestations of this planned economy are collectivization of farms and regimentation of labor.

2. Certain critical

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2. Certain critical shortages of strategic materials and skilled labor and lack of basic facilities such as internal transportation and a merchant marine.

3. Certain areas within and without the bloc which are susceptible to Western penetration and conversion through U. S. technical "know-how" and trade.

4. Potential popular dissatisfaction with shortage of consumer goods.

5. Economic strains between Russia and the Satellites.

D. Military:

1. Political influence on military strategy and tactics and periodical purges of military leaders.

2. Nationalistic, rather than political, motivation of the military.

3. USSR occupation forces.

4. Lines of communication.

E. Cultural and Scientific:

1. Subservience of arts and sciences to Communist control.

2. Uncertainty of the entire cultural and scientific base.

3. Shortage of scientists and technicians.

F. Sociological:

1. Social status of women.

2. Continuing lack of progress of the individual's life.

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